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Abstract
Mechanisms for monitoring Murray Valley encephalitis (MVE) virus activity include surveillance of human cases,
surveillance for activity in sentinel animals, monitoring of mosquito vectors and monitoring of weather conditions.
The monitoring of human cases is only one possible trigger for public health action and the additional surveillance
systems are used in concert to signal the risk of human disease, often before the appearance of human cases.
Mosquito vector surveillance includes mosquito trapping for speciation and enumeration of mosquitoes to monitor
population sizes and relative composition. Virus isolation from mosquitoes can also be undertaken. Monitoring of
weather conditions and vector surveillance determines whether there is a potential for MVE activity to occur. Virus
isolation from trapped mosquitoes is necessary to define whether MVE is actually present, but is difficult to deliver
in a timely fashion in some jurisdictions. Monitoring of sentinel animals indicates whether MVE transmission to
vertebrates is actually occurring. Meteorological surveillance can assist in the prediction of potential MVE virus
activity by signalling conditions that have been associated with outbreaks of Murray Valley encephalitis in humans
in the past. Predictive models of MVE virus activity for south-eastern Australia have been developed, but due to the
infrequency of outbreaks, are yet to be demonstrated as useful for the forecasting of major outbreaks. Surveillance
mechanisms vary across the jurisdictions. Surveillance of human disease occurs in all States and Territories by
reporting of cases to health authorities. Sentinel flocks of chickens are maintained in 4 jurisdictions (Western
Australia, the Northern Territory, Victoria and New South Wales) with collaborations between Western Australia
and the Northern Territory. Mosquito monitoring complements the surveillance of sentinel animals in these
jurisdictions. In addition, other mosquito monitoring programs exist in other States (including South Australia and
Queensland). Public health control measures may include advice to the general public and mosquito management
programs to reduce the numbers of both mosquito larvae and adult vectors. Strategic plans for public health action
in the event of MVE virus activity are currently developed or being developed in New South Wales, the Northern
Territory, South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria. A southern tri-State agreement exists between health
departments of New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia and the Commonwealth Department of Health and
Aged Care. All partners have agreed to co-operate and provide assistance in predicting and combatting outbreaks
of mosquito-borne disease in south-eastern Australia. The newly formed National Arbovirus Advisory Committee
is a working party providing advice to the Communicable Diseases Network Australia on arbovirus surveillance
and control. Recommendations for further enhancement of national surveillance for Murray Valley encephalitis
are described. Commun Dis Intell 2001;25:33-47.
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Prologue
Arboviruses (arthropod-borne viruses) of public health
importance in Australia include flaviviruses and alpha-
viruses. Within the flavivirus group the important human
pathogens include Murray Valley encephalitis (MVE), Kunjin
(KUN), Japanese encephalitis (JE) and Dengue (DEN)
viruses. Alphaviruses causing human disease include Ross
River (RR) and Barmah Forest (BF) viruses. Other
arboviruses including Sindbis (SIN), Alfuy (ALF), Edge Hill
(EH), Kokobera (KOK), Gan Gan (GAN), Trubanaman
(TRU) and Stratford (STR) virus cause only mild or
inapparent infections.1
Of all the arbovirus infections, Murray Valley encephalitis
causes the most severe disease. In the last 2 years MVE
virus activity has increased with record levels of cases
reported in Western Australia and widespread activity in the
Northern Territory. In early 2001, 2 cases of Murray Valley
encephalitis acquired in the Alice Springs area of the
Northern Territory were reported, and a further case was
detected in Mt. Isa, Queensland (see case reports in this
issue of Communicable Diseases Intelligence). At the same
time sentinel chickens in New South Wales showed sero-
conversions to MVE virus for the first time since the last
national outbreak of Murray Valley encephalitis in 1974 (for
sentinel chicken results see report in this issue of
Communicable Diseases Intelligence).
In response to the increased MVE virus activity, the National
Arbovirus Advisory Committee (NAAC), a working party of
the Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA)
proposed that a scoping study of all current and possible
surveillance mechanisms for Murray Valley encephalitis be
undertaken. The collation of the information would facilitate,
in the event of a national outbreak, rapid identification and
co-ordination of these surveillance systems. The call for the
review also reflected the perceived need to address
cross-border issues that may arise during outbreaks and
identify gaps in the current surveillance mechanisms. This
document provides a summary of surveillance mechanisms
and vectorborne disease control initiatives for MVE virus in
Australia. Existing systems are described and other
surveillance systems that may be utilised in the event of a
widespread outbreak are discussed. Specific recommend-
ations for the improvement of national MVE virus
surveillance are proposed.
Background
Epidemiology of Murray Valley encephalitis
MVE virus is enzootic in the Kimberley region of Western
Australia and the Top End of the Northern Territory. The
virus is epizootic in the Pilbara and regions further south in
Western Australia and the southern half of the Northern
Territory. The situation in Queensland is less well
understood due to the dearth of data over the past three
decades. However, human cases occur sporadically
throughout the State, including southern Queensland.1
Since 1974, however, nearly all cases of arboviral
encephalitis due to MVE virus have been reported from
Western Australia and the Northern Territory,2,3,4 with MVE
activity and human disease occurring in most years. Virus
activity occurs in the wet season, with human cases being
infected between February and July.
Prior to 1974 only 1 case of encephalitis due to MVE virus
had been reported from Western Australia, and none from
the Northern Territory. Strong circumstantial evidence has
indicated that ecological and environmental changes
resulting from damming the Ord River and establishing the
irrigation area in the north-east Kimberley may have
provided conditions conducive to increased MVE virus
activity and endemicity.3 Any future changes to the
waterways in the north of Australia may further change the
ecology of the flaviviruses.
The history of severe epidemics of encephalitis in
south-eastern Australia (particularly in the Murray/Darling
River system) and the subsequent identification of MVE
virus has been previously described.4 These outbreaks
started in December/January, peaked in February/March
and declined in the cooler months. They occurred at
irregular intervals, the last being in 1974 and involving
approximately 58 cases, 13 of whom died.5,6,7
The 1974 outbreak spread to all mainland States of Australia
and led to the introduction of the term 'Australian
encephalitis (AE)'. The term AE has subsequently been
used to refer to encephalitis due to either MVE or KUN
infection,8,9 and has led to considerable confusion. It is
recommended that this term no longer be used and the
terms MVE encephalitis and KUN encephalitis replace this
nomenclature. If the infecting flavivirus cannot be different-
iated, MVE/KUN encephalitis should be used. While surveill-
ance mechanisms for KUN virus may be similar to that for
MVE virus, the focus of this paper will be MVE virus.
Clinical aspects
It has been estimated that 1 in approximately 1,000-2,000
persons infected with MVE virus will develop severe
encephalitis.10,11 A larger proportion will develop a milder
illness12 but the vast majority remain asymptomatic. How-
ever, estimations of the case:infection ratios are not based
on prospective data and are potentially inaccurate. It is likely
that the rates will be higher during epidemics or in those at
higher risk of severe disease.13
Murray Valley encephalitis is a potentially serious infection,
with symptoms that include headache, neck stiffness, fever,
tremor, weakness, confusion, fitting, and sometimes coma
and death. Burrow and colleagues describe specific clinical
features.9 These signs may not be immediately associated
with Murray Valley encephalitis by physicians when cases
occur in non-enzootic areas. Persisting fevers and seizures
are common in children. Cerebellar signs, brainstem feat-
ures (e.g. cranial nerve palsies such as facial palsies and
ophthalmoplegias) and spinal cord involvement (pseudo-
polio) are seen in more severe cases, often with an assoc-
iated tremor. Computerised tomography scans are usually
normal, but abnormalities on magnetic resonance imaging
may be dramatic (e.g. thalamic lesions). Examination of the
cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) usually shows a lymphocytic
pleocytosis and samples should be sent to a reference
laboratory for culture, serology and Polymerase Chain
Reaction (PCR).
The case fatality rate for Murray Valley encephalitis is 20 per
cent and approximately 40 per cent of survivors will be left
with permanent neurological damage.6,12 Young Aboriginal
children in Western Australia have a particularly poor
outcome.13 The incubation period has not been well defined
due to the difficulty in defining exact exposure episodes. No
primary sources of data provide information regarding the
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MVE virus-specific incubation period, other than from a
single case report from the 1974 outbreak, with an
incubation period of 28 days.5 This exceeds the range
reported for other arboviruses (5 to 15 days)14 and at the
moment the best estimate of the incubation period is 5-28
days.
MVE virus life cycle
There is a complex relationship between humans, verte-
brate hosts, mosquito vectors and the environment involved
in the ecology of most arboviruses. A range of factors may
be involved in establishing and maintaining the MVE virus
life cycle (Table 1).
MVE virus is transmitted to humans by mosquitoes and
there is no direct transmission from person to person. The
most common vector is the fresh water mosquito Culex
annulirostris,
1,7 although other possible vectors have been
identified.1,11 The possibility of survival of MVE virus in arid
areas via desiccation resistant Aedes tremulus eggs has
been described.15
Both field and experimental infection studies have been
used to investigate a number of vertebrate species as
potential hosts for MVE virus. A comprehensive review of
studies has been previously published.7 Investigation of wild
and domestic animals around the time of the 1974 outbreak
revealed infections in domestic fowls,16 wild birds and
horses.17 While serological field studies do confirm that
particular species can be infected with MVE virus, they do
not indicate what viral titres are achieved during infection
and how long these infections are maintained. Both of these
factors influence whether a particular vertebrate species is
likely to be a major host in the MVE virus life cycle.
Experimental studies have been undertaken to address
these issues. Following experimental infection, wild birds,
including herons and egrets, have been shown to develop
viraemias of 3 to 5 days duration. Maximal titres were
obtained in younger birds.18 Studies have shown that
domesticated animals such as fowl, pigs, cattle and horses
may also be experimentally infected19 but the role of these
species in natural transmission cycles is not believed to be
important. On the basis of laboratory and field experiments,
wild birds, particularly wading water birds are thought to be
important in the life cycle of MVE virus. The rufous night
heron (Nycticorax caledonicus, also known as the nankeen
night heron) is recognised as a major vertebrate host of
MVE virus.7
Meteorological events such as rainfall, temperature and
humidity also play a major role in the transmission of MVE
virus.20 Mosquito abundance is affected by the availability of
aquatic breeding habitats. Other factors such as temper-
ature, wind speed and wind direction affect their distribution
and life cycle. Outbreaks of Murray Valley encephalitis may
occur after unusually heavy and persistent rainfall and
subsequent flooding. Abnormal rainfall may increase the
numbers of mosquitoes and lead to movement of infected
birds from enzootic regions to epizootic regions.5,21 The
mechanisms by which outbreaks in south-eastern Australia
commence are unclear. One possibility is that MVE virus
may be enzootic in south-eastern Australia in cryptic foci
that are not detected by vector and vertebrate surveillance
mechanisms in the intervening periods between outbreaks,
but this seems to be an unlikely explanation given the
extensive surveillance efforts. A more plausible explanation
is that the virus is reintroduced by birds from the northern
latitudes following periods of extreme rainfall and flooding.
Indeed, genetic evidence demonstrates a lack of indepen-
dent divergence of Australian MVE lineages, which strongly
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Table 1. Factors that may affect establishment and maintenance of MVE virus life cycle
Virus Enzootic presence or reintroduction into the environment
Inter-epidemic survival
Vector Density, fecundity and longevity
Feeding patterns and feeding preferences
Oviposition and over-wintering
Distribution of vectors
Natural predators of vectors
Control mechanisms by humans
Vertebrate host Range of potential hosts species
Viral titre and duration of viraemia
Host species density and breeding
Prior exposure to the MVE virus
Movement and migration
Mosquito avoidance mechanisms
Environment Climate and weather, particularly temperature, rainfall and humidity
Physical landscape, such as presence of waterways
Human interventions on the environment, such as irrigation, drainage of swamps etc
Human Prior exposure to the MVE virus
Population distribution
Lifestyle factors
Use of preventative measures to avoid being bitten by mosquitoes
supports the re-introduction of MVE virus rather than the
presence of cryptic foci.22
Surveillance mechanisms
Mechanisms for monitoring MVE virus activity include
surveillance of human cases, surveillance of MVE virus
activity in vertebrate hosts, monitoring of mosquito vectors
for abundance, virus isolation from mosquitoes and climate
surveillance.23 In some jurisdictions monitoring of human
cases alone is insufficient for public health action,
particularly when there are alternative surveillance
mechanisms which may trigger action prior to the detection
of human cases, and when the outcomes of infection can be
so severe. If viewed in purely economic terms, the financial
costs of these additional surveillance systems must be
weighed against the cost of preventing human disease. The
prevention of 1 human case with permanent neurological
damage would make these systems cost effective. In the
United States of America (US) it has been estimated that the
community cost of a patient with permanent neurological
damage is $US3 million. No equivalent costings are
available in Australia, although it is likely that the value may
be less than that estimated for the US.
The additional surveillance systems are used in concert to
signal the risk of human disease. Monitoring sentinel
animals for MVE virus activity provides information
regarding whether MVE transmission to vertebrates is
actually occurring. Sentinel chickens flocks maintained in a
number of states and territories provide information on MVE
virus activity.24 Vector surveillance includes mosquito
trapping for speciation and enumeration of mosquitoes to
monitor population sizes and composition. Monitoring of
weather conditions and vector surveillance determines
whether there is potential for MVE activity to occur. Virus
isolation from trapped mosquitoes is necessary to define
whether MVE is actually present, but is difficult to deliver in a
timely fashion in some jurisdictions.
The trapping of live vector collections does require the use
of CDC/EVS CO2 baited traps, which may have logistical
constraints for remote regions of Australia, such as the
Kimberley region of Western Australia. The development of
PCR assays for detection of MVE virus in pools of mos-
quitoes would allow more timely reporting of the detection of
virus in mosquitoes and may obviate the need for live
mosquito collections. It would be advantageous if these
methods could be applied to mosquitoes that have been
collected in traps for up to a week. These methods remain in
the developmental stage in a number of laboratories across
Australia until technical problems are overcome. These
problems include the storage of trapped mosquitoes,
prevention of fungal growth, viral RNA degradation and the
presence of PCR inhibitors in large pools of mosquitoes.
Optimal pooling sizes must be determined before PCR is a
cost-effective and timely replacement for virus isolation
using current cell culture techniques.
Meteorological surveillance is used in the prediction of MVE
virus activity by signalling conditions that have been
associated with outbreaks of Murray Valley encephalitis in
humans in the past. Examination of climate meteorologic
information including rainfall, temperature and the Southern
Oscillation (SO) may assist the prediction of risk situations.
The SO is an inter-annual oscillation in tropical sea level
pressure between eastern and western regions of the
Pacific Ocean. The Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) is
calculated from the monthly or seasonal fluctuations in the
air pressure difference between Tahiti and Darwin. Positive
SOI values suggest that rainfall will be above average
across eastern Australia, while negative values suggests
that rainfall will be below average. The SOI predicts rainfall
to a lesser extent in central and western Australian states.
There are 2 models for the prediction of Murray Valley
encephalitis activity for south-eastern Australia using
climatic information. The Forbes model2 utilises rainfall
patterns and provides a quantitative approach to predicting
outbreaks of Murray Valley encephalitis. The model relies
on rainfall patterns in the preceding and current season of
MVE virus activity. The model predicts MVE amplification
where there has been above average rainfall in the current
and preceding summers, with the underlying hypothesis that
abnormal rainfall enhances breeding of both wading birds
and mosquitoes. The Nicholls model25 suggests a
qualitative association between Darwin atmospheric
pressure (a measure of SO) in autumn, winter and spring of
the preceding season and Murray Valley encephalitis
activity.
A mathematical model based on host and vector factors, has
been developed26 for the rural amplification of MVE virus in
southern Australia during the 1951 and 1974 outbreaks.
This model predicted the likely duration of the rural amplifi-
cation phase, estimated to have commenced in October of
the year prior to an outbreak. Thus it appears that seeding of
the south-eastern areas of Australia in the previous year is
important for the establishment of an outbreak in the
following season.
Evidence supporting the use of animal, vector and
climate surveillance mechanisms to predict disease in
humans
The complex MVE virus life cycle means that a number of
surveillance mechanisms can be utilised to predict MVE
virus activity. Whether this activity heralds human disease is
enhanced by drawing together of data from a number of
surveillance systems and evaluating their predictive ability in
light of human cases. The appropriate surveillance tools for
monitoring MVE virus activity may vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Factors such as whether the virus is enzootic or
epizootic, the frequency of human disease, the geography
and climate, the availability of laboratory facilities and other
infrastructure, competing public health concerns and the
availability of public health resources will affect what
surveillance mechanisms are appropriate. The ability to
evaluate the use of animal, vector and climate surveillance
is affected by the frequency of human disease, indeed, it is
difficult to evaluate the use of surveillance mechanisms in
the Murray Valley region given the last human cases
occurred in 1974.
Some of the best evidence for the use of non-human
surveillance mechanisms for predicting MVE activity comes
from Western Australia. The State has marked climate
variability and encompasses enzootic and epizootic regions,
as well as regions where no MVE virus activity has ever
been detected. Due to the logistical difficulties associated
with mosquito monitoring, sentinel chicken and climate
surveillance are the key elements for predicting MVE virus
activity in Western Australia. Large outbreaks (e.g. in 1993
and 2000) have been associated with abnormal weather
patterns in Western Australia. Data collected over the last
10 years of the sentinel chicken program indicate that
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seroconversions in sentinel chickens have preceded likely
dates of exposure of the first human cases by 2 to 18 weeks
in all but one situation during that period.27
While it has been shown that large outbreaks of Murray
Valley encephalitis are associated with abnormal weather
patterns in Western Australia, the use of climate surveill-
ance to predict outbreaks in south-eastern Australia remains
controversial, and should be used in conjunction with other
surveillance data. The Nicholls model provides more timely
prediction of the risk of Murray Valley encephalitis activity
compared with the Forbes model as it does not rely on
collection of data during the current season. The Forbes
model, however, has proved more accurate in recent years.
This model suggested there would be MVE virus activity in
south-eastern Australia during the 1999/2000 season when
there were a number of cases of Murray Valley encephalitis
in the Alice Springs area of the Northern Territory and a
single case in the north of South Australia. The Forbes
model again predicted activity for the 2000/2001 season,
which did occur. In comparison, the Nicholls model
suggested activity was unlikely in both seasons (personal
communication, S Doggett).
One of the difficulties with both the Forbes and the Nicholls
models is that they were based on major outbreaks of
arboviral encephalitis in south-eastern Australia, which have
not occurred since 1974. Both models were developed
using very small data sets and neither incorporates
observed activity in sentinel animals or addresses sub-
clinical infections. Neither scheme takes into account the
impact of other factors such as the breeding and movements
of vertebrate hosts and vectors, or the influence of human
activities on the natural landscape, such as irrigation and
land development. Similarly, public health messages
regarding the risk of arbovirus infection and widespread
vector management programs may have reduced the
incidence of human disease despite the presence of
weather conditions that have been associated with
outbreaks in the past.
Laboratory testing
Testing for MVE virus in humans
Virus isolation from blood is only possible in the very early
acute phase of the illness prior to the appearance of anti-
bodies. MVE virus has only been isolated from a small
number of human cases, and none since 1974. While
detection of viral RNA in CSF8 or blood28 using PCR has a
higher yield, most infections are diagnosed serologically.
Due to high levels of background flavivirus infection in
endemic areas, and the long-term persistence of IgM, it is
important to demonstrate rising titres of IgG or to have a
positive viral detection test (culture or PCR) to confirm acute
infection. If confirmatory laboratory evidence is unavailable
or inconclusive, then a detailed exposure and clinical
assessment is required to determine the likelihood of recent
infection. As there is broad cross-reactivity in antibodies to
the flaviviruses, assigning a particular virus as the cause
based on serology requires a test that is sufficiently specific.
Diagnostic and reporting guidelines for MVE (and other
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Table 2. Arbovirus research laboratories in Australia providing testing for vertebrate and vector
surveillance systems for MVE virus*
Location Laboratory Institute Testing provided
Western
Australia
Western Australian Arbovirus
Surveillance and Research
Laboratory
University of Western Australia Serological testing of vertebrate hosts
Mosquito collection and identification
Virus isolation from mosquitoes
Northern
Territory
AL Rose Virology Laboratory Department of Primary Industry
and Fisheries
Serological testing of vertebrate hosts
Mosquito collection and identification
Medical Entomology Branch Territory Health Services Mosquito collection and identification
New South
Wales
NSW Arbovirus Laboratory Institute of Clinical Pathology
and Medical Research,
Westmead
Serological testing of vertebrate host
Mosquito collection and identification
Virus isolation from mosquitoes
Victoria Victorian Institute of Animal
Sciences
Department of Natural
Resources and Environment
Serological testing of vertebrate hosts
Mosquito collection and identification
Virus isolation from mosquitoes
Australian Animal Health
Laboratory
Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research
Organisation
Serological testing of vertebrate hosts
Queensland Queensland Health Scientific
Services
Queensland Health Mosquito collection and identification
Arbovirus and Emerging
Diseases Laboratory
University of Queensland Serological testing of vertebrate hosts
Mosquito collection and identification
Virus isolation from mosquitoes
Tropical Public Health Unit Queensland Health Mosquito collection and identification
South Australia Mosquito Research Laboratory University of South Australia Mosquito collection and identification
* excluding opportunistic testing
arboviral diseases) have been developed29 and have
subsequently been refined in the Public Health Laboratory
Network case definitions.30
Vertebrates and vectors
There is a network of laboratories across Australia that
provides a range of testing for MVE virus activity in verte-
brates and vectors, including serological testing, mosquito
identification and viral isolation from mosquitoes (Table 2).
In addition, there are laboratories that provide such
services, but are not currently contributing to surveillance
systems. These laboratories may provide services on an ad
hoc basis for research purposes, for example, for the
opportunistic testing of domestic animals. Local councils in
some jurisdictions may also undertake mosquito identifi-
cation.
Public health action
Public health action is determined by assessing data from
the various surveillance mechanisms. It is impossible to fully
eliminate mosquito breeding, therefore, it is important to
warn the general public of the risk of Murray Valley
encephalitis once conditions are optimal for virus
transmission. Advice on personal protection and reducing
risk behaviour are the major public health messages. Such
warnings can be developed specifically to target the
lifestyles and literacy levels of at-risk communities. Mosquito
control programs may reduce the numbers of both mosquito
larvae and adult vectors in certain circumstances. However,
as there is no specific treatment for Murray Valley
encephalitis, prevention remains the most important
strategy for averting disease.
While it has not been possible to formally evaluate their
effectiveness, targeted public health campaigns, drawing on
evidence from animal, vector and climate surveillance, are
believed to be more effective than general warnings. Data
from these additional surveillance mechanisms can be used
to stimulate public awareness prior to the detection of
human cases.
Surveillance mechanisms in Australia
Surveillance of human cases
State and territory notifications
MVE virus is enzootic in the Northern Territory and cases of
Murray Valley encephalitis have been reported in a number
of years since the 1974 outbreak.10 In recent years,
members of CDNA agreed that notifiable diseases should
be reported by the jurisdiction in which the case is
diagnosed, rather than the likely place of infection. Infection
may be acquired as people travel through regions with MVE
virus activity, but diagnosis may be undertaken elsewhere,
when travellers return home or when severe cases are
transferred for medical treatment. The regional location of
acquisition of cases of Murray Valley encephalitis notified by
the Northern Territory is shown in Table 3. A presumptive
case of MVE acquired in Alice Springs was identified in
1997, but could not be confirmed due to the death of the
patient.31
Forty-one cases of Murray Valley encephalitis acquired in
Western Australia have been notified since the 1974
outbreak2,8,12,32 (regional location, of where infections were
acquired are given in Table 4). While regular activity has
been confined to the Kimberley, epidemic activity extending
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Table 3. Confirmed Murray Valley encephalitis
cases notified by the Northern Territory,
1974-2001 to date, by regional location of
acquisition
Year Region Cases (deaths)
1974 Katherine 1
Barkly 2
Alice Springs 2
1981 East Arnhem 1
1987 Darwin 1
1988 Arnhem Land 2
Darwin - Rural 1
1991 Darwin 1(1)
Barkly 1
1993 Katherine 5(1)
Acquired in WA 1
2000 Darwin - Rural/Katherine 1
Alice Springs 3
Acquired in WA 2(1)
Acquired in SA 1
2001 Alice Springs 2
Table 4. Confirmed Murray Valley encephalitis
cases notified by Western Australia,
1974-2001 to date, by regional location of
acquisition
Year Region Cases (deaths)
1974 Kimberley 1
1978 Kimberley 2
Pilbara 2
1979 Kimberley 1
1981 Kimberley 3
Pilbara 3
Gascoyne 1
1984 Kimberley 2
1986 Kimberley 1
1989 Kimberley 1(1)
1990 Kimberley 1(1)
1991 Kimberley 2(1)
1993 Kimberley 9(4)
1997 Kimberley 1
Gascoyne 1
1998 Kimberley 1
2000 Kimberley* 1(1)
Pilbara 2
Mid-west/Kimberley* 1
Mid-west 3
Gascoyne 1
Murchison 1
* Diagnosed and notified nationally by the Northern Territory.
further south causes occasional outbreaks outside this
region. In 2000 there was a new southerly extension of MVE
virus activity with cases occurring as far south as the
Mid-west region, coming within 300 km of the metropolitan
area.12
As well as a recent case in Mt Isa in 2001, 4 cases of Murray
Valley encephalitis have been reported in Queensland since
the 1974 outbreak, including 2 in 199133 (only 1 of which was
a confirmed case), one in 199434 and 1 in 1997 (personal
communication, J Hanna). The latter case was thought to
have contracted the disease in the Northern Territory, and
subsequently died. Ten cases scattered throughout
Queensland were recorded in the 1974 outbreak. As shown
in Table 3, one case of MVE acquired in the north of South
Australia was reported by the Northern Territory in 2000.
South Australia, New South Wales and Victoria have not
recorded a case of Murray Valley encephalitis acquired
within the Murray Valley region, since 1974. No Murray
Valley encephalitis cases have ever been reported from the
Australian Capital Territory or Tasmania.
National surveillance of human cases
All States and Territories report arbovirus infection to the
National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS)
maintained at the Commonwealth Department of Health and
Aged Care. From 1991 to 2000 flavivirus infections were
classified as either 'Dengue virus' or 'Arboviruses: not
elsewhere classified (NEC)'. From 1996 onwards the latter
included infections with MVE, KUN, JE, KOK and STR
viruses. It has not been possible to determine the number of
MVE notifications at a national level, from NNDSS for these
years. NNDSS is currently in the process of a major revision
and from 2001 onward it will be possible to distinguish the
different arboviruses at a national level.
There is some variation between the case definition for MVE
infection used by State and Territory health departments.
With the exception of the Northern Territory and Western
Australia, all jurisdictions use the 1994 National Health and
Medical Research Council (NHMRC) case definition35 that
includes serological identification of all infections with MVE
virus, whether encephalitis associated or not. In the
Northern Territory the case definition requires the presence
of a clinically compatible illness with features of encephalitis.
In Western Australia a laboratory diagnosis is supplemented
with a clinically compatible illness, however, this need not be
encephalitis. Therefore, in Western Australia, encephalitic
and non-encephalitic clinical cases are reported, but
asymptomatic cases are not. In the Northern Territory, only
Murray Valley encephalitis cases are reported. All other
jurisdictions report all MVE virus infections.
The Laboratory Virology and Serology Reporting Scheme
(LabVISE) is an additional surveillance tool maintained by
the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care.
LabVISE is a voluntary passive reporting scheme to which
sentinel virology and serology laboratories around Australia,
contribute. MVE virus is one of the infectious agents
reported by this system, however, the number of reports
may overestimate the true number of cases of Murray Valley
encephalitis as the total number will represent both
encephalitic and non-encephalitic infections. State and
Territory notifications may not truly represent the location of
disease acquisition and duplicates may also occur, due to
cross border testing and the transfer of patients for interstate
clinical management. IgM positive cases may also be
automatically notified even if they have not been shown to
be recent infections.
Animal, vector and climate surveillance in States and
Territories
Sentinel chicken surveillance programs are active in
4 jurisdictions; Western Australia, the Northern Territory,
New South Wales and Victoria and mosquito monitoring
complements the surveillance of sentinel animals in these
jurisdictions. In addition, other mosquito monitoring pro-
grams exist in South Australia and Queensland. No surveill-
ance mechanisms for monitoring MVE virus activity in
vectors or vertebrate hosts are operational in the Australian
Capital Territory or Tasmania.
New South Wales
Surveillance mechanisms in New South Wales include
mosquito-monitoring, virus isolation from mosquitoes and
sentinel chicken surveillance. The NSW Department of
Health (NSW Health) co-ordinates the New South Wales
Arbovirus Surveillance and Vector Monitoring Program.
Laboratory work for this program is currently contracted to
the Institute of Clinical Pathology and Medical Research
(ICPMR), Westmead. Comprehensive reporting from the
program is available on the Internet at:
http://www.arbovirus.health.nsw.gov.au.
The New South Wales arbovirus surveillance program has
sentinel chickens located across inland areas of the State
(Figure 1). Flocks of 15 chickens are located at 12 sites. The
flocks are bled at weekly intervals and tested for antibodies
to flaviviruses, including MVE and KUN viruses. All chickens
are replaced annually in October and additional birds may
be included mid season if a large number seroconvert. The
program also involves mosquito collection at locations
throughout the State (Figure 1). The trapping program
operates from mid-spring to mid-autumn (November to
April) to cover the period for natural activity and transmission
of arboviruses. Mosquitoes are collected weekly for vector
identification and quantitation and are processed for
isolation of MVE, KUN, EH, ALF, STR, KOK, SIN, RR and
BF viruses.
Data on the Southern Oscillation Index, rainfall and temper-
ature are obtained from the Bureau of Meteorology Website
(http://www.bom.gov.au). These data are used by the
members of the monitoring program to predict mosquito-
breeding capabilities. Climatic data are used to predict
potential Murray Valley encephalitis outbreaks using both
the Forbes and Nicholls models.
Northern Territory
Surveillance for MVE virus activity in the Northern Territory
consists of sentinel surveillance of virus antibodies in
sentinel chickens and virus isolation from mosquitoes.
Surveillance of sentinel chicken flocks for flavivirus activity is
a combined program between the Northern Territory Depart-
ment of Primary Industry and Fisheries (DPI&F), Territory
Health Services (THS), the University of Western Australia
(UWA) and volunteers. The program is designed to detect
flavivirus activity (including the enzootic arboviruses MVE
and KUN viruses and exotic arboviruses such as JE), in the
Northern Territory. Sentinel chicken flocks are maintained at
9 sites (Figure 2). Flocks are usually bled once a month and
the samples are sent to the Arbovirus Surveillance and
Research Laboratory, UWA, for specific testing for MVE and
KUN viruses. When the majority of chickens in a flock
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seroconvert in a season, the flock is replaced. As the
majority seroconvert each year, replacement can occur
mid-season. Most flocks are replaced annually and all are
replaced within 2 years.
The Northern Territory Mosquito Borne Disease Control
Program assists regional authorities with mosquito moni-
toring and provides advice and funding for direct mosquito
control for some of the major towns in the Northern Territory
(Darwin, Jabiru, Nhulunbuy on the Gove Peninsula,
Katherine, Tennant Creek, Alice Springs, and at Alyangula
on Groote Eylandt). Monitoring and control operations are
usually carried out by town councils or other local authorities
through local environmental health officers, with the
identification of all mosquitoes carried out by the Medical
Entomology Branch (MEB) of Territory Health Services.
The routine mosquito-monitoring program in Darwin con-
sists of 18 trapping sites throughout the Darwin urban area.
Although now discontinued, until recently mosquitoes were
routinely collected for virus isolation at Middle Point, near
Beatrice Hill. The Middle Point virus isolation collections
were part of a combined project with DPI&F and THS.
Mosquito trapping near sentinel chicken flocks aims to
correlate antibodies and virus isolates in the animals with
vector activity. Collection of mosquitoes for virus isolation is
currently on an ad hoc basis, during actual outbreaks or
periods of potential disease activity.
Four additional routine trapping sites are located in Jabiru,
5 in Gove, 3 in Tennant Creek, 4 in Katherine and 3 sites at
Alyangula on Groote Eylandt. The mosquito-monitoring
program in Alice Springs is a co-operative program between
the Alice Springs Town Council and the MEB in Darwin.
There are 6 regular mosquito-monitoring sites located in
Article
Figure 2. Sentinel chicken flocks in the Northern
Territory
Figure 1. Monitoring locations in New South Wales
Alice Springs. Environmental health officers from the Alice
Springs Town Council collect mosquitoes from these sites
on a weekly basis.
Information from the Bureau of Meteorology is used in
conjunction with animal and vector surveillance. Monthly
weather reviews are obtained from the Bureau of
Meteorology and rainfall patterns and daily rainfall records
are used to predict mosquito activity.
Queensland
Queensland has no State-wide surveillance system for
monitoring MVE virus activity in vertebrate hosts or vectors
and does not maintain sentinel chicken flocks. Mosquito-
monitoring is performed by local councils. While there are no
regular isolation programs, virus isolations from mosquitoes
or animals have been carried out by the University of
Queensland, the Tropical Public Health Unit Network
(TPHUN) within Queensland Health, the Queensland Health
Scientific Services and the Queensland Institute of Medical
Research. These research programs are funded in part by
Queensland Health and the NHMRC.
Three State health department entomologists are located in
Queensland, one in Brisbane and two in Cairns at the
Tropical Public Health Unit. Staff from the TPHUN in Cairns
and Townsville perform reactive monitoring on demand.
Extensive mosquito trapping for monitoring mosquito
abundance and arboviral isolation was carried out in a
number of sites in the Mt. Isa region in February to March
2001 in response to the human case of Murray Valley
encephalitis detected in February, 2001. Research based
activities are also carried out by the TPHUN. Mosquito
trapping is carried out in the Torres Strait, the Gulf of
Carpenteria and Western Cape York by the TPHUN, in
collaboration with the University of Queensland. While the
trapping is primarily to monitor potential for JE activity and
isolate the virus, the program also investigates the presence
of novel vectors in the region.
South Australia
Arbovirus surveillance in South Australia is co-ordinated by
the Department of Human Services, South Australia, and
consists of mosquito trapping in the Murray Riverland area
and virus isolation when required. South Australia local
councils perform mosquito surveillance and control in areas
other than the Torrens Island environs. Several councils
contract mosquito surveillance to the Mosquito Research
Laboratory at the University of South Australia. Seasonal
monitoring of the mosquito population is undertaken along
the Murray River. Live collections of mosquitoes for virus
isolation are sampled in response to high vector numbers
and are sent to Victoria for virus isolation. This has occurred
on several occasions in 2001.
Western Australia
The Western Australia Arbovirus Surveillance and
Research Laboratory, UWA, is funded by the Health
Department of Western Australia (HDWA) to co-ordinate a
sentinel chicken program and mosquito surveillance in
Western Australia, as well as providing confirmatory
serological testing for other sentinel chicken programs in
Australia. Sentinel chicken sites may vary from year to year,
depending on virus activity. In 2001, sentinel chicken flocks
were maintained at 11 sites in the Kimberley, 13 sites in the
Pilbara, at 2 sites in the Gascoyne and at 3 sites in the
Mid-west (Figure 3). Twelve birds are maintained at each
site. The flocks are bled fortnightly from November to May
and monthly at other times during the year. Samples are
tested for MVE virus specific antibody activity using an
epitope-blocking enzyme immunoassay. Seropositive
chickens are replaced once half the chickens in the flock
have seroconverted. In addition, all flocks are replaced
annually during the dry season.
In the more remote regions of Western Australia it is not
logistically or financially feasible to undertake routine
mosquito surveillance, and experience has shown that
surveillance using sentinel chickens provides adequate
warning of increases in the activity of MVE virus. An annual
program of mosquito trapping is undertaken towards the end
of the wet season when MVE virus activity is usually highest.
Field collections are undertaken at all major towns in the
Kimberley as well as at some Aboriginal communities. The
mosquitoes are collected over a 3 to 4 week period and then
subsequently tested in the Arbovirus Surveillance and
Research Laboratory, a process that takes several months
to complete. While not prospective, this program provides
important data on size and species composition of mosquito
populations, vector species and virus infection rates. It also
assists in matching specific meteorological conditions to
breeding and infection rates of vector mosquito species.
Opportunistic field collections are carried out in response to
seroconversions in sentinel chickens and extreme weather
events in a number of other areas of the State. The
University of Western Australia and the HDWA also
undertake field surveillance for incursion of exotic vector
mosquitoes and viruses, including surveillance at specific
new or proposed developments such as dams, irrigation
projects or mine sites. Local councils may also undertake
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Figure 3. Sentinel chicken flocks in Western
Australia
mosquito trapping for species identification, enumeration
and evaluation of their mosquito management programs.
Climate surveillance also provides vital information for the
prediction of arbovirus activity using meteorological data
obtained weekly from the Bureau of Meteorology Website.
Graphs of weather patterns in all towns from the Kimberley
to Esperance are produced and used to predict arbovirus
activity. The SOI is used to predict rainfall, although this
measure is not as accurate at predicting rainfall in Western
Australia as it is in the south-eastern regions of Australia.
Therefore, modelling of Murray Valley encephalitis activity
using the Forbes and Nicholls models is not as reliable in
Western Australia.
Victoria
The Department of Human Services (DHS) contract the
Victorian Institute of Animal Science (VIAS) to conduct
sentinel chicken surveillance from November to April.
Chicken flocks of 20 birds are located at 10 locations
(Figure 4). Flocks are bled weekly from mid-October to April,
although surveillance may be extended in periods of MVE
virus activity. Flocks are replaced annually. Blood samples
are tested for flaviviruses by enzyme linked immunosorbent
assay (ELISA). Cross-reactivity with members of the
flavivirus family is investigated with further tests to identify
the infecting virus.
Six municipal councils in Victoria, including Greater
Shepparton, Mildura Rural, Moira, Swan Hill Rural,
Wellington and Wodonga Shire Councils, undertake
mosquito surveillance. Four traps are placed in each area
and mosquitoes are collected weekly and sent live to the
VIAS for identification, enumeration and virus isolation.
Adult mosquito abundance and distribution are assessed in
combination with climatic information such as temperature,
wind direction and wind speed. The Victorian Arbovirus
Task Force examines the risk of outbreaks of Murray Valley
encephalitis using meteorological surveillance data such as
SOI and rainfall deciles using both the Forbes and Nicholls
models.
Other surveillance mechanisms
Further surveillance mechanisms may include monitoring of
other flaviviruses in animals, opportunistic testing of dom-
estic and non-domestic animals, seroprevalence studies in
humans and vector monitoring.
Surveillance mechanisms for other flaviviruses in
animals
Currently there are programs in operation which monitor
other arbovirus activity, including human flaviviruses such
as JE, or arboviruses of importance to the livestock industry,
such as bluetongue. These systems have the potential to
provide additional information about the activity of MVE
virus or other flaviviruses. Collections of sera from these
programs could be tested for MVE virus activity, although
the value of testing of other sentinel animals for MVE virus
activity is yet to be fully determined. Both the Australian
Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) and the State veterinary
laboratories are involved in surveillance programs.
The National Arbovirus Monitoring Program
The National Arbovirus Monitoring Program deals primarily
with bluetongue viruses but also with bovine ephemeral
fever and akabane viruses. The program involves approxi-
mately 70 sentinel cattle herds of 10 to 15 animals each,
distributed around Australia. Sentinel cattle are monitored
serologically and by virus isolation. Insect trapping for
Culicoides, the major vector of bluetongue, is conducted in
conjunction with the sentinel herds. The Berrimah
Veterinary Laboratories in Darwin undertake virus isolation
from weekly collections from sentinel cattle at Beatrice Hill
Farm in the Northern Territory.
The Northern Australian Quarantine Strategy
The Commonwealth Government through the Northern
Australian Quarantine Strategy (NAQS) of the Australian
Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) runs a monitoring
program for JE. At the start of each wet season, groups of
young sero-negative pigs are placed at strategic sites in the
Torres Strait Islands, Cape York Peninsula and in the
Northern Territory. Animals from Queensland sites are
tested by AAHL and Queensland Health Scientific Services.
AAHL screens these sentinel pig sera with a competitive
ELISA for JE, which detects cross reactions with endemic
Australian flaviviruses. Reactive sera are then tested by a
plaque reduction neutralisation test for neutralising
antibodies to JE, MVE and KUN viruses. The sentinel pigs
surveillance system operating in the Northern Territory is
co-ordinated by the DPI&F. Pigs are maintained at each site
at Berrimah and Beatrice Hill on the Adelaide River flood
plain. The animals are bled monthly and tested for broad
flavivirus activity by the AL Rose Virology Laboratory at the
DPI&F. Positive test results are further investigated with
serum neutralisation tests specific for MVE, KUN and JE
viruses.
Surveys of feral animals including pigs, cattle, donkeys,
goats, and deer are undertaken as part of NAQS. Domestic
animals are surveyed in the Torres Strait and in the Northern
Peninsular area. A NAQS team periodically samples wild
migratory birds in the Torres Strait. The Arbovirus
Surveillance and Research Laboratory at UWA tests sera
provided by NAQS from cattle herds in the Kimberley for
antibody to MVE, KUN and JE viruses. Sera from a wide
range of other vertebrates have been tested for flavivirus
antibodies since the first detection of JE virus in the Torres
Strait in 1995.
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Figure 4. Sentinel chicken flocks in Victoria
Opportunistic testing of animals
Serological surveys provide evidence of past or recent
infection with arboviruses in domestic and non-domestic
animals, but their use as an early warning system is limited.
Survey data are unreliable indicators of recent virus activity,
unless undertaken in young animals, and do not take into
account issues such as animal migration. They do, however,
provide data for hypothesis generation regarding the range
of vertebrate hosts of the virus and define regions of virus
activity.
Non-domestic animals
Regular testing of sera from birds and animals from both
enzootic and epizootic regions of MVE virus activity is
undertaken in Western Australia. Serological reactivity to
flaviviruses has been investigated in western grey kang-
aroos opportunistically bled during culling exercises in
South Australia (personal communication, M Kokkinn). In
January 2001, NSW Health and the Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO)
undertook opportunistic sampling of a breeding colony of
rufous (nankeen) night herons along the Murray River. In
Victoria, wildlife sera collected following culls of kangaroos
and possums, are opportunistically tested for MVE virus.
Domestic animals
Opportunistic testing of domestic chickens in regions where
sentinel chickens are not located has been used in Western
Australia for many years to provide additional information
about activity of MVE virus in epizootic regions, particularly
to define the spread of MVE virus activity. It was used very
successfully, for example, in 2000 to demonstrate the
southern and eastern limits of activity of MVE virus during a
major outbreak in humans. Results were subsequently used
to determine the most appropriate location for new flocks of
sentinel chickens in the Mid-west, Murchison and Goldfields
regions.
Testing of domestic chickens was recently undertaken in
New South Wales in response to sero-conversions in
sentinel flocks, targeting areas with large human pop-
ulations surrounding the sites of sentinel chicken activity.
Areas further north were also included to assess whether
the virus was moving in a North-South direction. The NSW
Department of Agriculture recently tested a range of
domestic animals to determine the spatial distribution of
MVE virus activity and to compare the usefulness of dogs,
cattle, horses, and domestic chickens as sentinels for MVE
virus, in and away from major human population centres. In
South Australia, DHS co-ordinated the testing of domestic
chicken flocks at Paringa in February 2001 in response to
recent seroconversions in sentinel chickens in New South
Wales and Alice Springs. There are currently plans for
testing domestic cattle in the Yunta area of South Australia
to further investigate MVE virus activity. Opportunistic
testing of cattle has been undertaken in Victoria in response
to the recent MVE virus seroconversions in sentinel
chickens.
The evidence that arboviruses affecting human health
cause disease in animals is controversial. Animals
(particularly horses) presenting with symptoms of
encephalitis (ataxia) or arthritis (stiffness or swollen joints)
may be tested for RR, KUN and MVE viruses. Methods for
diagnosing recent arbovirus infection in animals have only
lately become available and are not fully validated. Rising
KUN IgG titres and RR IgM reactivity have been occasion-
ally demonstrated in animals showing signs of disease,
where more common causes of disease have been
excluded (personal communication, P Ellis). Further
research is required to confirm whether these are coinci-
dental infections or the causative agents. No surveillance
mechanisms are active to monitor these diagnoses. The
National Animal Health Information System is an analogous
system to NNDSS, but does not currently record animal
infections with arboviruses that affect human health.
Seroprevalence studies in humans
Seroprevalence studies in humans are useful for deter-
mining who is susceptible within a given community and
provide information on the epidemiology of MVE virus.
When undertaken following an outbreak, it is possible to
determine the ratio of symptomatic to subclinical cases. As
with studies in animals, seroprevalence studies in humans
are not useful for early warning of MVE virus activity. Some
of the early seroprevalence studies investigating MVE virus
infections in humans36,37,38,39 are difficult to interpret due to
cross-reactions of haemagglutination-inhibition antibodies
with other flaviviruses. Studies monitoring the sero-prev-
alence of antibodies to MVE virus using more specific ELISA
have been reported.9,40,41 These investigations provide an
indication of the level and patterns of MVE virus exposure
within a community.
Vector monitoring by AQIS
A vector-monitoring program is run by AQIS for the
surveillance of exotic mosquito species. Surveillance is
conducted at each international airport in Australia (currently
16 locations) and each seaport (currently 47 locations)
within a 400 metre radius of the port. The vector monitoring
program is supported by the AQIS First Port Airport
Disinsection Program and the First Port Seaport Mosquito
Control Program with the aim of maintaining an exotic vector
free status around airports and seaports. While the focus of
this work is not MVE virus surveillance, endemic vector
species are trapped frequently. In the event of an outbreak
this surveillance mechanism could provide details on vector
abundance at the various sites.
Geographical Information Systems
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) have the potential
for surveillance of mosquito vector habitats. Dale and
colleagues have published a non-technical review of the use
of GIS for this purpose.42 Further investigations may be
required to assess the utility of this method of surveillance of
vector habitats in relation to MVE virus activity. GIS can
overlay data from multiple sources and could be used to
map the distribution of human cases, virus activity, climatic
and environmental information.
Control mechanisms
Mosquito management
Local government is the main agent of mosquito manage-
ment in most jurisdictions, including New South Wales, the
Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Western
Australia and Victoria. Effective mosquito management
incorporates a range of practices, with emphasis on an
integrated approach, focussing on source reduction,
appropriate town planning and other preventative measures
as well as vector management using chemicals.43
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Management programs vary according to regional require-
ments, as not all procedures are appropriate in all situations.
The practicality, logistics and cost of such measures in
enzootic areas needs careful consideration. Mosquito
control is not feasible in many remote areas of northern
Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory
where there are large and widespread natural wetlands.
Instead, local governments tend to carry out community
based procedures. While not applicable in all situations,
both larviciding and adulticiding can be used to decrease
vector numbers in or near residential areas. Aerial larvicide
applications are used in some areas (e.g. in the Northern
Territory) when surveillance programs determine that
health-driven mosquito management is required. Adult-
iciding using fogging may be used if an outbreak is
indicated, but this measure only temporarily decreases the
number of mosquitoes. As the use of adulticiding remains
controversial, its use can be restricted to barrier fogging of
residential areas in times of very high vector abundance or
disease risk and to protect communities where application of
larvicides is logistically impossible. There is an emphasis on
the use of environmentally acceptable chemicals for mos-
quito management.
Changes in agricultural practice (e.g. clearing vegetation in
waterways and avoiding excessive irrigation), may also
affect vector numbers. Land management to control
breeding sites through engineering and drainage has been
instituted. In addition to monitoring natural mosquito-
breeding sites, local councils liaise with town planners to
monitor and prevent mosquito breeding in waste-water
treatment and disposal facilities, public works and land
development projects such as residential, aquaculture,
industrial and mining developments.
State and Territory health authorities assist regional
authorities with mosquito monitoring. They also:
• provide funding, technical expertise, notification data,
educational materials and training programs for local
government personnel and other public and private
parties who develop and operate mosquito
management systems;
• provide funding for the establishment of new mosquito
management programs;
• provide emergency mosquito management in the
advent of an arbovirus disease outbreak or when there
is a risk of disease transmission to humans;
• collaborate with industry towards the development of
new mosquito management products and methods; and
• provide research funding for studies on prevention and
management of arboviral disease.
Media campaigns
Most jurisdictions have developed educational material on
mosquito avoidance and arbovirus disease. Media alerts are
distributed in New South Wales, the Northern Territory,
Queensland, South Australia and Victoria in response to
MVE virus activity. The public is made aware of the health
risks associated with mosquito bites and that mosquito bites
and domestic breeding sites can be avoided or reduced.
Self-protection mechanisms include the use of screens,
knockdown aerosol sprays, residual insecticides and
mosquito repellents. Information for the public is also
available on ways to prevent the contamination of ground
pools with organic matter generated from overflowing septic
tanks or other waste-water. Human movement into areas of
high breeding, for work or recreational purposes increases
risk. The public is also advised of measures to avoid being
bitten, for example, avoiding fishing at dusk and dawn, and
avoiding camping in risk areas during months when the virus
is likely to be present. Public access to high-risk areas may
be temporarily closed.
Some jurisdictions have developed additional campaigns.
As a result of recent activity, NSW Health is developing an
emergency management plan for MVE that includes media
releases and fact sheets for General Practitioners and the
general public. In the Northern Territory a 'mozzie sickness
alert' poster is distributed to communities, the Northern
Territory tourist bureau, and is displayed in roadhouses. A
Murray Valley encephalitis pamphlet is sent to the Northern
Territory Tourism association for distribution to the general
public. Annual media campaigns including mosquito and
disease awareness advertisements are conducted by the
THS through the MEB. In South Australia media releases
from DHS regarding the risk of vector borne disease are
sent out to the public at specific times of the year, such as
prior to the Easter and Christmas holidays. In Western
Australia a 'beat the bite' campaign is currently being
developed to promote education regarding mosquito bites,
particularly to school aged children. In addition, a culturally
appropriate pictorial health alert has been developed by the
UWA and the Kimberley Public Health Unit. This is issued to
Aboriginal communities in the Kimberley, Gascoyne and
Pilbara regions in association with the wider HDWA public
warnings. These have been made available to other states
in 2001. Mosquito awareness campaigns have been
undertaken in primary schools in Western Australia and
Victoria. In response to MVE activity in western Queensland
in 2001, the TPHUN used newspaper bulletins and a poster
to warn the public of risk and how to protect themselves from
mosquitoes.
State-based strategic plans for MVE virus activity
Since 1990 a southern tri-State agreement has existed
between the Health Departments of New South Wales,
Victoria and South Australia and the Commonwealth
Department of Health and Aged Care. All partners have
agreed to co-operate and provide assistance in predicting
and combatting outbreaks of mosquito-borne disease in
south-eastern Australia. In addition, several jurisdictions
have developed specific state-based strategic plans.
New South Wales
The New South Wales Arbovirus Disease Control Advisory
Group provides advice on arbovirus disease issues and
makes recommendations pertaining to surveillance and
management activities to NSW Health. Membership of this
group includes representatives from NSW Health, the New
South Wales Department of Agriculture, local government,
the Australian Institute of Environmental Health, the New
South Wales Arbovirus Surveillance Program, infectious
disease and virology experts and medical entomologists.
The committee is chaired by the Director of Health
Protection of NSW Health. A strategic plan for arbovirus
disease control is being developed44 and is available at:
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/health-public-affairs/
greenpaper/index.html.
Through the New South Wales Arbovirus Surveillance
Website (www.arbovirus.health.nsw.gov.au), the Depart-
ment of Medical Entomology, ICPMR, has provided a
comprehensive and readily available resource to the
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general public on mosquitoes, mosquito management and
mosquito-borne diseases.
Northern Territory
Contingency plans for mosquito control have been
developed in the Northern Territory. Due to the vast areas of
land affected by water during the wet season, it is
impractical to control vectors over large areas or around
many of the smaller towns and communities. Strategic plans
to control mosquitoes during mosquito-borne disease
outbreaks are restricted to high priority sites such as
sewerage treatment facilities in smaller communities and
swamps adjacent to large urban areas in Darwin and other
major towns. Public awareness campaigns are important
features in these strategies.
In the event of a mosquito-borne epidemic in Darwin, the
Mosquito Control Advisory Committee meets and discusses
control and public awareness measures. This committee
consists of representatives of the Communicable Diseases
Branch, the MEB, the Darwin City Council, a general
practitioner and members representing the public and other
interested groups. The contingency plan includes
information on the organisation, cost and initiation of
contingency measures. Additionally, a counter-disaster
sub-plan provides further details regarding the control of
mosquito vectors in the event of natural disasters, which
may be associated with vector borne disease. There is also
a Zoonosis Committee chaired by the Centre for Disease
Control, Darwin, with representatives from MEB, DPI&F,
NAQS, the Royal Darwin Hospital (laboratory and clinical
services) and the Parks and Wildlife Commission.
South Australia
The Department of Human Services has convened a special
working party to develop a strategic plan for mosquito
control. This document has been drafted and is currently
being distributed to key stakeholders (particularly local
government bodies) for comment.
Western Australia
The State Arbovirus Control Committee (which includes
representatives from HDWA, UWA, PathCentre, the Aust-
ralian Defence Force, Agriculture WA and other national and
international experts as required) has developed a
contingency plan for Murray Valley encephalitis in Western
Australia. The committee developed protocols to reduce
exposure of humans to arboviral disease, to be
implemented when surveillance systems provide an
indication of activity of MVE virus. The protocols include the
surveillance systems themselves, a notification procedure,
the timing, severity and area to be covered by public
warnings and control measures to be implemented. Control
measures involve public education at several levels, source
reduction and chemical control.
Victoria
A contingency plan for control of arbovirus disease has been
developed by the Victorian Arbovirus Task Force.45 The task
force consists of representatives from DHS, the Department
of Natural Resources and Environment, the Victorian
Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory and local
government. The contingency plan details notification
procedures for human cases, mosquito management
procedures, surveillance in animals and a response
strategy. The latter is based on prediction of epidemic years,
based on both the Forbes and the Nicholls models. The plan
is a step-by-step guide for personnel involved in an outbreak
of arbo-encephalitis as well as detailing procedures used to
predict MVE virus activity in the region.
National Strategies
The National Arbovirus Advisory Committee
The National Arbovirus Advisory Committee includes repre-
sentatives from the Commonwealth Department of Health
and Aged Care, State and Territory health departments,
CSIRO, AQIS and academia. Laboratories involved with the
diagnosis of both human and animal disease, epidem-
iologists, clinicians and entomologists are also represented
on the committee. The NAAC is funded by the Common-
wealth Department of Health and Aged Care, which also
provides the secretariat. The NAAC is to report and make
recommendations to the Communicable Diseases Network
Australia on arbovirus surveillance and control.
Conclusions
This scoping exercise has identified a number of
surveillance activities operating within Australia that provide
information on MVE virus activity and drive public health
action. The collation of information regarding these
surveillance systems represents the first step in the process
of building on our current strengths by recognising
opportunities for collaboration and identifying gaps in the
current approach. Further steps include addressing these
gaps, strengthening old and building new collaborations and
developing national approaches. While Murray Valley
encephalitis is a relatively rare disease, its increasing
incidence and the severity of the condition means we must
be pro-active in our approach to ensure we have timely and
effective mechanisms for detecting virus activity and
delivering warning of this risk to the general public.
Strengthening national surveillance of MVE virus activity is a
first step in ensuring that Australia is prepared to rapidly
detect, contain or mitigate new or emergent arboviral
diseases. The 1999 outbreak of encephalitis associated with
West Nile virus in New York City46 provides a number of
valuable lessons regarding the management of arbovirus
disease outbreaks, including the need to enhance
awareness and training of clinicians, build public health
resources and expertise, strengthen laboratory capacity,
and improve communication between human and animal
health authorities. The very nature of the life cycle of MVE
virus and other arbovirus diseases requires that our
prevention strategies are built on strong inter-sectorial
communication between all stakeholders who have access
to timely information on the complex ecology of arboviruses.
The use of Web-based information and surveillance
systems, including Geographical Information Systems, the
further development of predictive models, and the develop-
ment of comprehensive response plans will assist our ability
to assess and manage the risk of important diseases.
Recommendations
Following the review of national surveillance and control
mechanisms for Murray Valley encephalitis, the following
recommendations can be made.
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1. Evaluation and possible expansion of current
sentinel animal surveillance mechanisms
This review of national surveillance and control mechanisms
for Murray Valley encephalitis has allowed the identification
of gaps in our current systems with the outlook to close
these gaps in the future. It was not the aim of the current
exercise to formally evaluate the existing surveillance
mechanisms. All schemes may benefit from a formal
appraisal, which may be carried out using the framework for
evaluations published by the Centers for Disease Control,
Atlanta.47 Current sentinel animal systems for surveillance
of MVE virus activity do not cover all areas where cases of
Murray Valley encephalitis have been detected. National
surveillance of MVE virus activity could be enhanced by
development of sentinel chicken programs in these areas if,
after review, these are deemed necessary.
2. Development of national reporting of animal and
vector surveillance data
The development of a system for collation of national animal
and vector surveillance data would ensure timely reporting
and allow cross border comparisons. Development of a
Website may represent a feasible option for such a system.
This system should be co-ordinated and developed in
consultation with key stakeholders, including a range of
Commonwealth bodies, State and Territory health depart-
ments, virologists, clinicians, epidemiologists, entomol-
ogists, veterinarians and other animal health specialists.
3. Development of national human case reporting
Limited data on cases of Murray Valley encephalitis are
currently collected on a national basis. While the develop-
ment of the NNDSS will provide additional data, an
enhanced data set could be developed for Murray Valley
encephalitis with the flexibility to include other arboviruses.
Nationally consistent case definitions, data fields and
reporting procedures are important components of
standardised case reporting. The surveillance system for
human cases could be linked to the animal and vector
surveillance system. Issues of confidentiality and security
need to be addressed.
4. Establishment of a national strategic approach for
Murray Valley encephalitis disease management
and control
While some jurisdictions have developed strategic plans for
outbreaks of Murray Valley encephalitis at the State and
Territory level, it would be beneficial for a national body to
develop a framework document providing guidance on the
essential elements of response plans and identify multi-
jurisdictional issues. Such strategic approaches could
encompass all aspects of disease surveillance manage-
ment and control and would consolidate and establish
further inter-sectorial communication between key
stakeholders. Strategies should address the issue of new or
emerging arboviral disease.
5. Development of laboratory capacity and building
public health resources
There is a perceived need to have a better quality assurance
programme, and particularly a need to standardise reagents
for MVE virus diagnosis. This should also extend to a
comparison of the efficacy, sensitivity and specificity of
various tests in use by different laboratories. Development
of PCR based assays for the detection of MVE virus in pools
of mosquitoes would provide more timely and cost effective
surveillance, particularly if the methods can be developed to
detect viruses in mosquitoes without the need for live
collections.
Good communication between all stakeholders is essential.
Systems to enhance clinicians’ awareness of the clinical
features of Murray Valley encephalitis should be explored,
and could be incorporated into messages regarding the
identification of other emerging arbovirus diseases.
Methods for summarising and facilitating rapid and accurate
communication of information to those who need to know
should be explored. Such mechanisms may include disease
modelling, GIS, electronic data transmission and
Web-based reporting.
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